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Rethinking Legally Relevant Mental Disorder
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN"
INTRODUCTION
The law insists on maintaining mental disorder as a predicate for a wide
array of legal provisions, in both the criminal justice system and the civil law.
Among adults, only a person with a "mental disease or defect" can escape
conviction for an intentional, unjustified crime on grounds of cognitive or
volitional impairment.' Only people with "mental illness" or "mental
disorder" may be subjected to indeterminate preventive commitment based on
dangerousness.2 Under the laws of many states, only people with a mental
disorder are prevented from making decisions about treatment, criminal
charges, wills, contracts, and a host of other important aspects of life.3
What is it about "mental illness" that merits such special legal treatment?
Why are mentally ill people singled out by the law in so many different
contexts? These questions can be answered only by first figuring out what the
law is trying to accomplish in those areas in which it makes mental illness
relevant. In undertaking this effort, this article focuses on those settings in
which mental illness is a predicate for either avoiding or imposing a
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
1. Children under the age of seven have an infancy defense. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW 424, 467, 474 (3d ed. 2000). The duress defense is available to non-mentally ill adults but is based
on external threats rather than "internal" volitional impairment. Id. at 467.
2. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,83 (1992) (White, J.. plurality opinion) (noting that a system
which permitted commitment of dangerous persons who are not mentally ill would be a departure from "our
present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for mental
illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law").
3. On the relevance of disorder to criminal competency, see infra note 92. On civil matters, see
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL
HEALTh PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 340-41 (2d ed. 1997) ("Many state [guardianship] statutes...
require findings of a threshold status (e.g., mental illness, idiocy, and senility) ... ").
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deprivation of liberty. It is in these situations, where the stakes are the
highest, that precisely determining what the law means and should mean when
it uses the term "mental illness" and like terminology is most important.
The article starts, in Part I, with a description of how the behavioral
sciences have defined mental disorder. The definitions are varied and
expansive, leaving the law plenty of working room. Part 11 then looks at how
the law treats the concept of mental illness. In general, the law's definitions
of this phenomenon have been equally vague, and they are often nonrespon-
sive to its own normative objectives.
Part I, the heart of the article, takes on the oft-neglected task of identify-
ing the goals of laws that deprive people of liberty. Based on my previous
work, it argues that laws which deprive people of liberty should only be
focused on mental illness to the extent it affects culpability, deterrability, or
competency. It further concludes that, in determining whether a person lacks
culpability, is undeterrable, or is incompetent, the law should focus on the
content of the person's thoughts. Aberrant thought content can be distin-
guished from a number of other characteristics of mental illness, most promi-
nently an aberrant thought process. Analysis of one's thought process might
include an examination of thought content but would also require examining
the consistency and coherence of the person's beliefs and desires and perhaps
a number of other variables as well. This article argues that in deciding whom
to deprive of liberty for the purposes of punishment, prevention, or protection
the content of the person's thought process is the most relevant consideration,
not how he or she arrives at that content or other mental phenomena.
Finally, Part IV explores the advantages and disadvantages of a content-
based approach to legally relevant mental disorder. The advantages include:
a strong reaffirmation of most people's responsibility, deterrability, and com-
petence; a concomitant destigmatization of mental disorder; and more precise
legal standards. At the same time, a content-based definition of legally rele-
vant mental disorder might represent an uncomfortable departure from lay
understandings about mental disorder, make some legal determinations more
subject to manipulation by litigants, and lead to an emphasis on autonomy
values that perhaps should be downplayed with our increasing knowledge
about the causes of human behavior.
There are two overarching theses to this article. The first is that the
choice as to how mental illness should be defined for legal purposes should
be based on pragmatic as well as normative concerns since normative analysis
leaves so many questions unanswered. A related thesis is that mental disorder
is such a vacuous phrase that the law should consider dispensing with it as an
independent criterion for intervention and instead simply identify as precisely
as possible the types of mental dysfunction it wants to treat specially.
[Vol. 29
HeinOnline  -- 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 498 2002-2003
MENTAL DISORDER
I. CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MENTAL ILLNESS
Everyone knows that mental illness and its semantic brethren, mental
disability and mental disorder, are not easily defined. The only thing we can
say for sure about the concept is that it has continually expanded in scope.
Stretched by new discoveries about the causes of human behavior, our
society's willingness or desire to label quirky behavior sick,4 and-if one
believes the cynics-the desire on the part of mental health professionals to be
compensated by insurance companies for all their patients' problems,5 the
term "mental illness" applies to a far wider array of phenomena than it did a
century ago.
Consider the approach taken in the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, the bible of psychiatric nosology known
simply as DSM (now in its fourth edition, and thus called DSM-IV).6 DSM-
IV states that a "mental disorder" is
a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or
pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present
distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one
or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly
increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss
of freedom.'
Furthermore, DSM-IV states the syndrome or pattern cannot be "an expectable
and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event" (such as death of a
loved one).' Although this language does impose some limits, many have
noted that terms such as "distress," "disability," "loss of freedom," and
"expectable and culturally sanctioned" are hugely value-laden and still permit
a wide amount of leeway in defining specific disorders.9 The drafters of
4. See STUART A. KIRK & HERB KUTCHINS, THE SELLING OF DSM: THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE IN
PSYCHIATRY 28 (1992) ("[Nlone of the revisions [of the DSM have been] stimulated by clinical
practitioners demanding a new classification system."); see generally ALAN M. DERSHOWrrz, THE ABUSE
EXCUSE: COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES AND OTHER EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
5. Daniel Goleman, Who's Mentally ll, 11 PSYCHOL. TODAY 34,34 (1978) (quoting George Albee,
past president of the American Psychological Association, as saying that the expansion of diagnostic
categories in the DSM is an attempt by the American Psychiatric Association to "turn[] every human
problem into a disease, in anticipation of the shower of health-plan gold that is over the horizon").
6. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS' N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICALMANUALOFMENTAL DISORDERS (4th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IVI. The 1994 edition was revised in 2000 (and christened DSM-IV-TR) but
in all relevant respects is the same as the 1994 version.
7. Id. at xxi.
8. Id.
9. See KENNETH MARK COLBY & JAMES E. SPAR, THE FUNDAMENTAL CRISIS IN PSYCHIATRY:
UNRELIABILrrY OF DIAGNOSIS 20 (1983) (calling the DSM a politically motivated compromise between
2003]
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DSM-IV admit as much, stating "that no definition adequately specifies
precise boundaries for the concept of 'mental disorder."' 1
Undeterred by this admission, DSM-1V includes in its listing of "mental
disorders" an enormous number of syndromes and psychological patterns
(over three hundred in the fourth edition). In the approximate hierarchy likely
to occur to a layperson asked to define "craziness," the major DSM categories
might be organized as follows:
" Psychoses (e.g., schizophrenia, manifested by hallucinations and
delusions);"
* Dementias (involving a significant loss of consciousness and
memory); 2
* Mood disorders (e.g., the bipolar disorders, manifested by
swings between severe depression and mania); 3
* Dissociative disorders (including dissociative identity disorder,
formerly known as multiple personality disorder); 4
* Mental retardation; 5
* Anxiety disorders (including post-traumatic stress disorder); 6
• Personality disorders (a large category that is meant to encom-
pass "an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture"' 7 and that includes paranoid personality disorder; schi-
zoid personality disorder (detachment from social relationships
and a restricted range of emotional expression); schizotypal per-
sonality disorder (odd beliefs or magical thinking; unusual per-
ceptual experiences including bodily illusions; excessive social
anxiety); antisocial personality disorder (disregard for and viola-
tion of the rights of others); borderline personality disorder
(impulsivity; inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controll-
ing anger); histrionic personality disorder (excessive emotion-
ality and attention seeking); narcissistic personality disorder
(grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy); avoid-
ant personality disorder (feelings of inadequacy and hyper-
differing interpretations of the data, outright dogma, and propaganda); see generally KIRK & KUTCHINS,
supra note 4.
10. DSM-IV, supra note 6, at xxi.
11. Id. at 302.
12. Id. at 133.
13. Id. at 317.
14. Id. at 477.
15. DSM IV, supra note 6, at 39.
16. Id. at 393.
17. Id. at 629.
[Vol. 29
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sensitivity to negative evaluation); dependent personality dis-
order (submissive and clinging behavior related to an excessive
need to be taken care of); and obsessive-compulsive personality
disorder (preoccupation with orderliness, perfectionism, and
control));' 8
* Sexual disorders (including pedophilia) 9 and impulse disorders
(including pyromania and kleptomania);20
* Eating and sleeping disorders2I and disorders that feature exag-
gerated symptoms (somatoform and factitious disorders); 22
* Substance abuse disorders that do not result in dementia, includ-
ing not just alcohol and drug-related disorders but caffeine and
nicotine-related disorders.23
One can certainly dispute the ordering of this list. But its expansive
scope, which overlaps with behaviors most of us experience at least to somedegree,24 cannot be denied.
Uncomfortable with that fact, some have tried to cabin the clinical
concept of mental illness in various ways. In doing so, they have focused on
either the effects, the process, or the cause of the phenomenon to be labeled.
One example of the effects approach is a proposal that would narrow the
DSM's emphasis on distress and disability to conditions that impose a serious
"biological disadvantage"-more specifically, death or reduced fertility.25 This
threshold is said to encompass only the first three categories listed above, plus
severe drug dependence and sexual disorders such as homosexuality.26 A
prominent illustration of the process approach is the equation of mental illness
with "irrational" thought content. 2' Advocates of this approach contend that
18. Id.
19. Id. at 493.
20. DSM-IV, supra note 6, at 609.
21. Id. at 539, 551.
22. Id. at 445.
23. See id.
24. Cf HERB KUTCHINS & STUART KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY 243 (1997) (summarizing NIMH
study applying the DSM diagnostic criteria that found "that 32% of American adults have one or more
psychiatric disorders in their life[time and] that 20% have a disorder at any given time"); see also R.C.
Kessleret al., Lifetime and 12-Month Prevalence of DSM-III-R Psychiatric Disorders in the United States,
51 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 8 (1994) (50% report at least one lifetime disorder and 30% reported at
least one disorder within the past year).
25. R.E. Kendell, The Concept of Disease and Its Implications for Psychiatry, 127 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 305 (1975).
26. Id. at 307.
27. MICHAEL MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 244-45 (1984); see
also Christopher Boorse, What a Theory of Mental Health Should Be, 6 J. THEORY OF SOC. BEHAV. 61,63,
72 (1976) (focusing on dysfunctional mental processes).
2003]
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irrationality is most likely to be a feature of the first few symptom complexes
listed, although it could occasionally occur in connection with some of the
other symptom patterns as well. 2 Finally, as an example of the etiological
move, some mental health professionals believe that the term "mental illness"
should be reserved for those problems that are biological in origin (leaving the
term "mental disorder" to cover the rest).29 The theory here is that organically
caused disabilities, among which the psychoses are thought to be good
examples, are more deserving of the (more serious?) illness rubric.30
There are obvious problems with all of these definitions. Using an in-
creased chance of death and reduced fertility as markers of illness seems both
under and overinclusive: eating disorders and routine substance abuse (neither
of which are considered illnesses under this approach) often hasten death and
diminish sexual drive,3' while the psychoses don't necessarily shorten life or
decrease procreative powers;32 the fact that homosexuality can be classified
as a mental illness under this definition speaks for itself. Irrationality pro-
bably comes closest to capturing the lay sense of "craziness," but it can be
almost as difficult to operationalize as mental disorder itself, a claim explored
more fully below.33 And biology may well play a major role in causing all
mental problems. As the drafters of DSM-IV state, "A compelling literature
documents that there is much 'physical' in 'mental' disorders and much
'mental' in 'physical' disorders." Eric Kandel summarizes the literature in
this way: "[B]ehavioral disorders that characterize psychiatric illness are
disturbances of the brain function, even in those cases where the causes of the
disturbances are clearly environmental in origin."35
28. MOORE, supra note 27, at 244-45. Moore calls psychiatry's expansion of the mental illness
concept "conceptual imperialism" aimed more at defining conditions psychiatrists might treat than at
grappling with the problem of what constitutes an improperly functioning mind. Id. at 198-210.
29. See RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW & THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 412 (3d ed. 1999) ("(A] mental disorder is any of the diagnostic categories listed in DSM II ....
When one switches to the term mental disease or mental illness, one is suggesting that this is a sickness,
that it has some kind of biological basis.") (quoting the testimony of Dr. Park Elliot Dietz in the trial of
John Hinckley); see also MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 44 (1999) ("The term
'disease' generally is reserved for conditions with known pathology (detectable physical change). The term
'disorder,' on the other hand, is reserved for clusters of symptoms and signs associated with distress and
disability (i.e., impairment of functioning), yet whose pathology and etiology are unknown.").
30. REISNER ET AL., supra note 29, at 412.
31. DSM-IV, supra note 6, at 519, 541.
32. Many people with manic-depression, for instance, lead long and productive, if very intense,
disrupted and disrupting lives, even when left untreated. See generally D. JABLOW HERSHMAN & JULIAN
LIEB, MANIC DEPRESSION AND CREATIVITY (1998) (describing Newton, Dickens, and Picasso, as well as
Chopin, Van Gogh, and Marilyn Monroe, as people with manic-depression).
33. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
34. DSM-IV, supra note 6, at xxi.
35. Eric R. Kandel, A New Intellectual Frameworkfor Psychiatry, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 457, 460
(1998).
502 [Vol. 29
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At the same time, as these last statements suggest, the image of mental
disorder as simply the product of defective organs is wrong, a fact which
further complicates matters. Kandel again:
Social or developmental factors also contribute very importantly...
to behavior, including social behavior, so behavior and social factors
can exert actions on the brain by feeding back upon it to modify the
expression of genes and thus the function of nerve cells. Learning,
including learning that results in dysfunctional behavior, produces
alterations in gene expression. Thus all of nurture is ultimately
expressed as nature.36
The so-called medical (or biological) model of mental illness appears to be
ascendant at the present time, but developmental, learning-behavioral, and
social factors also significantly influence behavior and mental processes,
"disordered" or not.37 Mental disorder may be, as the DSM-IV definition cited
above asserts, "in the individual," but it is virtually always a product of
interaction with the rest of the world.
In part for this reason, Thomas Szasz has famously argued that mental
illness is a "myth."3 8 To Szasz, either a person has a brain disease, in which
case the appropriate intervention is neurological, or he or she has a "problem
in living," which is not an illness but a social condition.39 For most of what
we call mental disorder, Szasz asserts, "[T]he norm from which deviation is
measured is a psychosocial and ethical standard," not a physical one.4"
Although there is much to be said against Szasz' s ultimate position that mental
illness does not "exist,"'" his insight about the strong influence social norms
exert on the definition of mental illness is worthy of emphasis. Indeed, in a
sense Szasz does not go far enough in his critique. Regardless of our ability
to correlate certain brain structures and bodily chemicals with certain
symptoms, the definition of mental illness, like the definition of illness
generally, is as much cultural as it is scientific. As Ralph Slovenko has said,
36. Id.
37. For a description of the medical, psychoanalytic, behavioral, and social models of mental
disorder, see Paul Lazare, Hidden Conceptual Models in Clinical Psychiatry, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 345
(1973).
38. THOMAS S. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INsANrrY 12 (1970) ("[T]he concept of mental illness.., has
outlived whatever cognitive usefulness it might have had and... now functions as a myth.").
39. Id. at 21 ("[T]he phenomena now called mental illnesses [should] ... be removed from the
category of illnesses, and [should] be regarded as the expressions of man's struggle with the problem of how
he should live.").
40. Id. at 16.
41. See Michael Moore, Some Myths About Mental Illness, 18 INQUIRY 233 (1975).
2003]
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"[M]ental disorders are exaggerations of normal psychodynamics, 4 2 with
society in general and mental health professionals in particular determining
what is "exaggerated" and what is "normal."
As confusing as all this may be, it seems like a perfect setup for the law
in its attempts to define mental disorder. After all, the job of legislatures and
courts is to make normative judgments. Since science is not able to tell us
who is "crazy" and who is not, the law should step up to the plate. More often
than not, however, it has stayed in the dugout.
11. LEGAL APPROACHES TO MENTAL ILLNESS
No less an authority than the U.S. Supreme Court has counseled that
judges and legislators, not psychiatrists or other mental health professionals,
should define the scope of legally relevant mental disorder.43 The DSM also
cautions that its nosology does not necessarily map onto legal constructs."
Those sentiments are wise. Unfortunately, however, in detailing the scope of
mental disorder for legal purposes, legislatures and courts have often fallen
down on the job or inappropriately delegated it to others, at least in those
settings involving potential deprivations of liberty.
A. The Insanity Defense
One would think that the law would be most interested in accomplishing
the task of demarcating legally relevant and irrelevant mental illness in
connection with the insanity defense, the most conspicuous, if not the most
commonly used, arena for determinations of mental illness. But despite
centuries of law, the usual test for insanity still speaks simply in terms of
"mental disease or defect," without further elaboration."5  The result is
enormous vagueness about the predicate for the insanity defense.
Of course, in order for an insanity claim to succeed, the mental disease
or defect must cause significant cognitive or volitional impairment at the time
of the offense. In the words of the popular American Law Institute test, it
42. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 54 (1995).
43. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) ("The legal definitions of 'insanity' and
'competency' . . . vary substantially from their psychiatric counterparts .... Legal definitions ... which
must 'take into account such issues as individual responsibility... and competency,' need not mirror those
advanced by the medical profession.").
44. DSM-IV, supra note 6, at xxiii ("In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV mental
disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a "mental disorder," "mental
disability," "mental disease," or "mental defect.").
45. DONALD H.J. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 129 (1983) ('[11t is a common feature of [insanity] tests that they lack significant definition
or provision of nonnormative criteria for the concept "mental disease.").
504 [Vol. 29
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must result in a lack of "substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of [the] conduct or to conform [the] conduct to the requirements of the
law."46 A well-known criminal law treatise asserts that this language is the
gravamen of insanity, and that the mental disease or defect predicate is not
meant to serve any significant limiting role.47 But the consequences of that
view would be dramatic, at least in theory. Many conditions not normally
associated with "insanity" correlate with substantial cognitive or volitional
impairment. Psychopaths, dependent personalities, and people with mild
mental retardation might not appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.48
Pedophiles, people with explosive personalities, and people who commit
crime to feed addictions may have trouble conforming their behavior to the
requirements of the law.49 Since, if the DSM is our guide, any one of these
people could be said to have a mental disease or defect,5 ° the term needs more
content than simply equating it with a substantial lack of appreciation or
control if these types of people should be held responsible for their criminal
acts. 5'
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
47. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 331 ("[Ilt would seem that any mental abnormality, be it psychosis,
neurosis, organic brain disorder, or congenital intellectual deficiency... will suffice if it has caused the
consequences described in the second part of the test.").
48. See ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS
AMONG Us 34,44 (1993) (reporting that psychopaths "seem unable to 'get into the skin' or to 'walk in the
shoes' of others," lack remorse or guilt, lack empathy, and have shallow emotions); DSM-IV, supra note
6, at 665 (Dependent personalities "feel so unable to function alone that they will agree with things that they
feel are wrong rather than risk losing the help of those to whom they look for guidance."); C. Benjamin
Crisman & Rockne J. Chickinell, The Mentally Retarded Offender in Omaha-Douglas County, 8
CREIGHTON L. REV. 622,646 (1975) (Although mentally retarded persons "may be able to distinguish right
from wrong in the abstract," they have difficulty "applying such abstract concepts to specific factual
settings.").
49. DSM-IV, supra note 6, at 522 (describing "essential features of a Paraphilia" as "recurrent,
intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors"); id. at 609-10 (describing "intermittent
explosive disorder" as evidenced by "discrete episodes of failure to resist aggressive impulses... grossly
out of proportion to any precipitating psychosocial stressorfs]"); id. at 178 (describing the pattern of
"compulsive [substance use]"); id. at 618 (describing a symptom of "pathological gambling" as commission
of "illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance gambling").
50. See supra notes 48-49.
51. The same problem afflicted the Durham regime that existed in the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals from 1954 to 1972. In Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the
court established the "product" test for insanity, which stated that an accused was insane if his or her
"unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." In MacDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1962), in an attempt to limit the scope of this test, the court defined mental disease or defect
to mean "any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional process and
substantially impairs behavior controls." Many have noted that this definition merely replicates the AL
lack of appreciation and lack of control formulation, with its attendant vagueness. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra
note 1, at 348.
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In recognition of this problem, some formulations of the insanity defense
have narrowed the universe of mental disorders that can form the basis for an
insanity defense. The American Law Institute insanity formulation includes
a paragraph meant to exclude psychopathy as a basis for excuse,52 a clause that
many states have adopted. 53  Several states have gone further, prohibiting
insanity claims based on any type of personality disorder.54 Apparently along
the same lines, the federal insanity statute requires a "severe" mental disease
or defect.55 Case law in some jurisdictions has expressly prohibited insanity
based on conditions that are solely the result of "passion" or of substance
abuse.56 Finally, a few states have adopted definitions tied to their civil
commitment statutes. For instance, Michigan defines mental illness or defect
for insanity purposes as "[a] substantial disorder of thought or mood that
significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or
ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life."57
While these latter formulations do limit the scope of the insanity defense,
they are either under or overinclusive. Excluding psychopathy, substance
abuse disorders, or some other narrow category of disability still leaves large
numbers of individuals eligible for an insanity defense who probably should
not be. On the other hand, the blunderbuss approach-exemplified by the
exclusion of all personality disorders (a category which includes paranoid,
schizotypal, and borderline disorders)-prevents people with very bizarre
thought content and process from arguing for an excuse.58 The federal test's
use of the word "severe" may raise the same problem, but since the word is
not defined further, it is hard to know.59
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1962).
53. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 351 (stating that "most" ALI states include this paragraph).
54. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 39 (West 2002); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-13 (West 2001) (prohibiting insanity based on pathological gambling).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000). The legislative history states the word was used to exclude
"nonpsychotic behavior disorders or neuroses such as an 'inadequate personality,' 'immature personality,'
or a pattern of 'antisocial tendencies."' S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 229 (1983).
56. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that drug addiction is not a
mental disease unless it causes "actual drug-induced or drug-aggravated psychosis, or physical damage to
the brain or nervous system"); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (Va. 1952) ("Frenzy
arising solely from the passion of anger and jealousy, regardless of how furious, is not insanity.").
57. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1400(g) (West 1999) (mental health code).
58. See, e.g., DSM-1V, supra note 6, at 634 (stating that people with paranoid personality disorder
"often feel that they have been deeply and irreversibly injured by another person or persons even when there
is no objective evidence for this"); id. at 645 (describing symptoms of "schizotypal personality disorder"
to include "odd beliefs or magical thinking," and "unusual perceptual experiences, including bodily
illusions"); id. at 651 (noting that "[diuring periods of extreme stress," people with borderline personality
disorder can experience "transient paranoid ideation or dissociative symptoms").
59. See supra note 55.
[Vol. 29
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Michigan's formulation is the most interesting. It combines both the
effects (impairment in coping ability) and process (impairment in judgment)
approaches to mental disorder.6° It does not depend simply on undifferen-
tiated diagnosis but on specific dysfunctions. But it is still far too imprecise
because it could encompass virtually any mental condition, a fact which
Michigan courts have recognized.6 Indeed, the Michigan definition of mental
illness for insanity purposes is identical to that used in that state's guilty but
mentally ill statute,62 a law that is routinely applied to garden-variety criminals
and results in a verdict that has no mitigating impact in terms of ultimate
disposition.63
B. Civil Commitment
The same types of observations can be made about the definition of
mental disorder in the civil commitment context. As recently as twenty years
ago, many state civil commitment statutes did not bother to define the term at
all or defined it tautologically, in terms of a condition in which "mental health
is substantially impaired."64 Today most states use language similar to
Michigan's 65 (which, it will be recalled, contemplates "a substantial disorder
of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity
to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life").66
That language (which I shall continue to call, for brevity's sake, the
"Michigan" formulation) is clearly an improvement over the older formula-
tions, but it still is fatally lacking in precision in this context as well.
The reasoning necessary to reach that conclusion requires breaking
commitment into its two components, police power commitment and parens
patriae commitment. Police power commitment permits involuntary hospita-
60. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1400(g) (West 1999).
61. People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593,597-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (interpreting the language of
Michigan insanity statute to permit a defense based on non-psychotic disorder and stating that "mental
impairment due to any cause, physical or purely psychological, may form the basis for a finding of mental
illness").
62. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 2000) (describing guilty but mentally ill verdict as
an alternative to insanity); see also MICH. STATE BAR STANDING COMM. ON STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, MICHIGAN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.12 (2d ed. 2003 Supp.) (definition of guilty
but mentally ill).
63. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (West Supp. 2003) (stating that a person found guilty
but mentally ill shall be sentenced to "any sentence that could be imposed by law upon a defendant who
is convicted of the same offense"); People v. McLeod, 288 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. 1980) (no right to treatment
for those found guilty but mentally ill).
64. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 307.
65. Id.
66. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1400(g) (West 1999).
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lization of those who are mentally disordered and dangerous to others.67 Many
commentators have suggested that civil commitment of those considered
potentially harmful to others ought to be reserved for those who are so
disordered that they would be found insane were they prosecuted for a crime.6 8
Even those who do not subscribe to this notion, which includes the Supreme
Court justices who were in the majority in Kansas v. Hendricks,69 require that
people subject to police power commitment suffer from a "mental abnorm-
ality" that makes them "dangerous beyond their control."7°
The Michigan language on its face could encompass either the insanity
or dangerous-beyond-control standard, but it does a poor job on both scores.
The fact that it can encompass either standard exposes its main defect, since
these two concepts are only tangentially related. Consider first whether the
language captures those who would be excused on insanity grounds if they
committed crime. In Michigan, as already pointed out, this language also
describes those who are guilty "but mentally ill," which suggests that it is
applied to many who would not be excused were they to commit a crime.
Putting aside that fact, which could be due to legislative oversight, the
language making eligible for commitment those who have "substantial
impairments of judgment and behavior" also easily applies to people with
antisocial personality,7 ' individuals rarely found insane when they commit
crime and therefore, presumably, people who generally should not be
committable under the excuse rationale.
Indeed, such individuals are not even "dangerous beyond their control"
in the sense that phrase is used in Hendricks. The Supreme Court has in-
dicated that this language should distinguish between non-insane individuals
who are detainable preventively and non-insane individuals who are simply
67. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979) ("The state also has authority under its police
power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.").
68. See, e.g., ROBERTSCHOPP, COMPETENCY, CONDEMNATION, ANDCOMMrrMENT 149-50,165-66
(2001) (arguing that police power commitment is permissible only for those who lack "retributive
competence," and comparing the latter concept to insanity); Stephen Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and
Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026-27 (2002) (arguing that sexual predator commitment should
be limited to those who are "non-responsible"); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190,1233 (1974) [hereinafter Civil Commitment] (The "criminally insane"
is a group that "contains individuals whose mental condition excludes them from the operation of the
traditional punishment-deterrence system" and justifies treating them differently, through "preventive
detention.").
69. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
70. Id. at 358.
71. See DSM-1V, supra note 6, at 646. People with antisocial personality disorder tend to make
decisions "on the spurof the moment, without forethought, and without consideration for the consequences
to self or others," display "a pattern of impulsivity" and "a reckless disregard to the safety of themselves
or others," and also tend to be "consistently and extremely irresponsible." Id.
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ordinary felons.72 Yet the ordinary felon is often diagnosed with antisocial
personality disorder 73 (which, as just pointed out, is subsumed under the
Michigan definition). A solution to this problem might be to retain the
Michigan language but exempt antisocial personality or perhaps all persona-
lity disorders from its coverage, as some civil commitment statutes do. But,
as already noted, some people with personality disorders do suffer from condi-
tions that might excuse or make them dangerous beyond their control.
Perhaps all of this sounds too finicky, but these definitional issues have
real consequences. A huge percentage of the population could be considered
"dangerous to others," including most of those who are released from prison.7
4
The definition of mental disorder may determine whom among them is subject
to further commitment. Since the resurgence of sexual predator statutes in the
1990s, there have been literally hundreds of judicial decisions grappling with
the definition of mental abnormality in connection with commitment of sex
offenders who have completed their prison terms.75 Some courts have
required a specific finding that the person subject to commitment be severely
volitionally impaired,76 while others have been satisfied with a finding that
"mental abnormality" and "dangerousness" are linked, or do not require any
72. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (stating that the "inability to control" formulation
is meant to "distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an
ordinary criminal case"); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (holding that the sexual predator commitment statute
is constitutional because it "narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable
to control their dangerousness").
73. The Supreme Court itself recognized this fact in Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, where it stated that the
dangerous-beyond-control "distinction is necessary lest 'civil commitment' become a 'mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence'-functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment," and then
cited Reid Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 SOC. PSYCHIATRY &
PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 231, 234 (1999) for the proposition that 40%-60% of the male prison
population is diagnosable with antisocial personality disorder.
74. See Janine DeFao, Jerry Brown's About-Face on Criminal Sentencing, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb.
18, 2003, at Al ("[Sleventy-one percent of California's inmates land back in prison within eighteen
months.").
75. A Westlaw search of cases which include the terms "definition" and "mental" produced over
eight hundred decisions, over two-thirds of which deal with the definition of mental abnormality in sex
offender commitment cases.
76. Converse v. Dep't of Children and Families, 823 So. 2d at 295,297 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (stating
a jury must find that the offender's dangerousness was caused by or linked with a mental abnormality that
made it "difficult, if not impossible" to control behavior); In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d
260, 266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (stating some judicial-lack-of-control determination must be made
whether it be "difficult, if not impossible," "serious difficulty," or inability to "adequately control");
Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 790 (Mo. 2002) (stating that "'mental abnormality' means a congenital
or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree" that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his
behavior).
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special showing at all.77 Riding on the outcome of this debate is the liberty of
thousands of sexual offenders. In the future, we are sure to see the prolifera-
tion of "predator" commitment statutes outside of the sex offender area,78
making the issue addressed here even more important.
The Michigan language is equally inapposite as a way of implementing
the parens patriae component of civil commitment, which focuses on danger
to self and on inability to provide for basic needs (the latter sometimes called
"grave disability").79 Here, too, the precise scope of legally relevant mental
disorder is an important limiting criterion, for all sorts of behavior-ranging
from smoking and overeating to attempts at suicide-can be classified as self-
harming. As they have with respect to police power commitment, commenta-
tors and the Court have diverged on the meaning of mental disorder in this
setting. Commentators have tended to view the primary focus of the inquiry
to be the competency of the individual to make the relevant decisions, °
whereas the Supreme Court has spoken of the parens patriae power in terms
of the state's interest "in providing care to its citizens who are unable ... to
care for themselves.'
Once again, the ubiquitous Michigan formulation does not adequately
capture the legal agenda. With one possible exception, its multi-part defini-
tion of mental disorder (focusing on impairments in judgment, behavior,
ability to recognize reality, and ability to cope) fails to operationalize either
incompetency or inability to care.82 Anyone who has a DSM-IV diagnosis and
who engages in seriously self-harming behavior could be said to have a
"substantial disorder that significantly impairs judgment [or] behavior" since
no one in their "right mind" would intentionally harm themselves. 3 Yet such
77. People v. WoUschlager, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171,174 (Ct. App. 2002) (California sexual predator
law "clearly presumes a serious difficulty in controlling behavior: if a person cannot control his dangerous
behavior to the extent that he is predisposed to commit criminal sexual acts and thus becomes a menace
to others, he has sufficient volitional impairment to be found an SVP."); In re Luckabaugh, 568 S.E.2d 338,
348 (S.C. 2002) (no special finding required); In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784,793-95 (Wisc. 2002) (serious
difficulty in control is implicit in nexus between the mental disorder and substantial probability of future
sexual violence; failure to instruct on serious difficulty not error).
78. Cf CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960-2981 (West 1999) (permitting commitment of people who have
a severe mental disorder that is not in remission and cannot be kept in remission without treatment and who
represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others).
79. See generally MELTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 309-10.
80. See SCHOPP, supra note 68, at 82 ("Absent criteria of commitment that entail incompetence for
person, no putative justification for parens patriae civil commitment coheres with the broader set of
principles underlying the legal institutions of a liberal society."); Civil Commitment, supra note 68, at 1212-
17 (arguing that incapacity is a required threshold for parens patriae commitment).
81. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979).
82. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 3 3 0.1400(g) (West 1999).
83. See id.
[Vol. 29
HeinOnline  -- 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 510 2002-2003
MENTAL DISORDER
people might well be competent to make the decisions they are making (think
of heavy smokers diagnosed with "nicotine use disorder"' or the recluse with
"social phobia""5). Likewise, many of these people are probably capable of
caring for themselves (including many "mentally ill" people who choose to be
homeless 6). The same can even be said of people with significant impair-
ments in their "capacity to recognize reality," as many psychotic people are
able to give competent reasons for refusing treatment, and, as just noted, can
survive on their own.87 It is more difficult to say that people who are signifi-
cantly impaired in their mental "ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life"88 are competent or able to care for themselves, but if that is the definition
of mental disorder, it collapses into the grave disability commitment criterion
found in virtually every commitment statute 9 and has no independent signifi-
cance.
C. Competency in Criminal Proceedings
The final type of liberty deprivation in which mental disorder plays a
significant role is in connection with determinations of incompetency to stand
trial and related issues. To be competent to deal with the criminal system, a
criminal defendant must be able, in the words of the Supreme Court's decision
in Dusky v. United States,90 "to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding" and "a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him."'" Dusky itself does not mention
mental disorder in connection with this test, but most state statutes assume that
84. DSM-IV, supra note 6, at 243.
85. Id. at 416-17 (characterized by persistent fear of one or more social situations).
86. Cf Robert Farr, A Mental Health Program for the Mentally Ill in the Los Angeles Skid Row
Area, in TREATING THE HOMELESS: URBAN PSYCHIATRY'S CHALLENGE 65, 71 (Billy E. Jones ed., 1986)
(describing research finding that the vast majority of homeless people in Los Angeles "would rather live
in filth and be subjected to beatings and violence than to be institutionalized even in our finest mental
hospitals").
87. Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III:
Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 171
(1995) (finding that, on any one of three competency measures used, only 25% of schizophrenic patients
were "impaired," and that even when all competency measures were combined, only 52% of schizophrenic
patients were "impaired," compared to 12% of patients suffering from angina).
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1400(g) (West 1999).
89. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1) (West 1998) (defining gravely disabled as "[a]
condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic
personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter"). Interestingly, Michigan has pretty much the same
commitment criterion. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West 1999).
90. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
91. Id. at 402.
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mental illness is the usual cause of incompetency.92 Given Dusky's language,
the apparent purpose of requiring proof of mental disorder in this context is
to ensure that any inability to understand the criminal process or make
decisions about it is the result of irrationality rather than ignorance or intran-
sigence.
If mental disorder is defined at all in competency statutes, it is described
in language similar to that found in the jurisdiction's commitment statute. In
this setting, the "Michigan language" is somewhat better at implementing the
law's objectives, at least with respect to "adjudicative competency," which
looks at the individual's ability to understand and communicate about the
process.93 A person who cannot understand the charges or talk to his attorney
because of substantial impairments in "judgment" or the "ability to recognize
reality" is in all likelihood "irrational" in the sense used by Dusky. But the
language is not very helpful in determining who is lacking in "decisional
competency," that is, competency in the context of making an important
decision in the criminal process.94 Assume the defendant wants to plead guilty
or waive an insanity defense and that the decision is against the attorney's
advice. How do we figure out when such decisions are "irrational"? The
Michigan language is useless in this situation. It does not tell us whom among
those who are significantly impaired in judgment, behavior, or ability to
recognize reality should have their control over these decisions taken away,
unless we say that all of these people, because of their resistance to their
attorney's advice, are irrational.95 The tautological nature of that solution
suggests the problem with the definition, which once again proves too
imprecise.
Current laws dealing with mental disability and deprivations of liberty
do not do a good job defining legally relevant mental disorder. They do a bad
job because they are insufficiently attentive to the specific role mental
disorder plays in specific contexts. Any attempt to revise the definition of
legally relevant mental disorder needs to begin with a better conceptualized
view of these roles.
92. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.12(2) (West 2001) (In determining competency, "[tihe experts
shall first determine whether the person is mentally ill.").
93. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope,
47 U. MIAMIL. REv. 539,550-51 (1993) (describing "competency-to-assist," or adjudicative competency,
as the capacity to understand the criminal process and communicate relevant facts to the relevant players
in the legal system).
94. Id. at 5 54-60 (describing "decisional competency" as the capacity to make a particular decision).
95. Even Professor Bonnie, who places great emphasis on whether the defendant disagrees with his
attorney for purposes of determining competency, see id. at 579, would not consider the fact of
disagreement alone grounds for incompetency. Id. at 579-80.
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m11. MENTAL DISORDER AND DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY-A SUMMARY OF
SEVERAL PROPOSALS
The legal objectives sought to be achieved by the insanity defense, police
power commitment, and incompetency determinations are obviously and
importantly different. These three settings represent what I have called the
punishment, prevention, and protection models of government intervention.96
The insanity inquiry takes place at a criminal proceeding where the primary
goal of the law is to determine whether punishment is merited. Police power
commitment is a "civil" process aimed not at punishment but at specific
deterrence, incapacitation, and (perhaps) rehabilitation. Competency deter-
minations, whether they take place in connection with civil commitment or the
criminal process, are meant to ensure autonomous decision making. The first
inquiry is retrospective, the second prospective, and the third focus primarily
on present mental status.
Beyond these basic propositions, much is hotly disputed. Reactions to
the insanity defense have ranged from proposals to replace it with a narrow
"mens rea alternative"'97 to judicial formulations that excuse any crime that is
the "product" of mental disease or defect.9" Some have advocated abolition
of civil commitment on the ground that people with mental illness are not
especially lacking in control,99 while others think it should be expanded to any
dangerous person with a mental abnormality," ° and still others believe it
should be extended to any mentally ill person who needs mental health
treatment, dangerous or not.'' Some believe incompetency should be defined
in terms of whether the person can register a choice,'0 2 while others come
close to adopting the position that any person who disagrees with a doctor or
lawyer is incompetent.0 3
96. Christopher Slobogin & Mark Fondacaro, Rethinking Deprivations of Liberty: Possible
Contributions from Therapeutic and Ecological Jurisprudence, 18 BEHAV. Sci. &L. 499, 500-01 (2000).
97. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201(2) (2001) (limiting acquittal on mental disorder grounds
to proof that "due to a mental disease or defect the defendant did not have a particular state of mind that
is an essential element of the offense charged").
98. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
99. Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the
Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 60 (1982) (arguing that involuntary commitment ought to be
abolished because "the assertion that the crazy behavior of mentally disordered persons is compelled, in
contrast to the freely chosen behavior of normal persons, is a belief that rests on commonsense intuitions
and not on scientific evidence").
100. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960-2981 (West 1999).
101. Cf. Darold A. Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in Need of Treatment: A Fourth Standard for
Civil Commitment, 36 HOSP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 259 (1985).
102. THOMAS SZASZ, INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 249-50 (1987).
103. Cf Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the Competence ofMental Patients to Refuse
Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 432 (1995) (finding in a study of competency determinations that
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Despite the highly contested nature of these disputes, one should not
forgive the law for failing to define mental disorder precisely. The law's
continued vague assertions that people with mental disorder can be treated
differently, without identifying more clearly in what sense they are different
for legal purposes, has resulted in normatively unsatisfying judgments,
unnecessary deprivations of liberty, and unfair stigmatization. The task of
figuring out legally relevant differences between those we call "disordered"
and those we do not is a hard one, but worth the effort.
In previous work, I have offered my take on these issues. Here, I will
only outline my arguments. The primary purpose will be to compare and
contrast the types of dysfunction that I think are relevant in the insanity,
commitment, and criminal competency contexts with other approaches.
A. Insanity: Integrationism
In general terms, the purpose behind the mental disorder predicate in
insanity cases is clear. Mental disorder is thought to diminish culpability,
determination of which is the primary focus of criminal punishment. As the
above discussion suggests, however, the law has not very accurately specified
the type of mental disorder that is relevant to the culpability inquiry.
Partly for that reason, I have argued that the insanity defense should be
abolished and that mental illness should only be relevant to culpability
determinations to the extent it leads to a lack of mens rea or to beliefs that
sound in justification or duress." More specifically, I have suggested that
there be four, and only four, excusing conditions: (1) the absence of intent
with respect to an element of the crime (i.e., the lack of mens rea defined
subjectively, in terms of what the defendant actually knew or was aware of);
(2) a mistaken belief about circumstances that, had they occurred as the person
believed, would amount to legal justification; (3) a mistaken belief that
conditions exist that amount to legally recognized duress; and (4) ignorance
of the concept of crime (as in the case of infants). 5 Any of these conditions
might result from "mental illness," but they might also exist in the absence of
any type of mental disorder.
I call this approach "integrationist" because it accords people who suffer
from mental illness the same defenses available to people who are not
mentally ill under modem criminal law statutes, no more and no less. Because
"[m]ost psychiatrists equated incompetence with either their finding of mental disorder or the patient's
unwillingness to acknowledge mental disorder" and that psychiatrists "often viewed any patient objections
[to proposed treatment] as irrational").
104. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role ofMental Disability in Criminal
Cases, 86 VA. L. REv. 1199 (2000) [hereinafter An End to Insanity].
105. Id. at 1202-07.
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these modem statutes provide an excuse for offenders who do not intend or
understand the consequences of their actions and for those who honestly
believe justificatory or coercive situations exist;"° they provide a wide array
of grounds for exculpation of offenders who are mentally ill. For instance, the
person whose psychosis leads him to believe that someone else's apartment
is his own or who thinks that he is killing a nonhuman lacks the mens rea for
burglary and homicide, respectively. Paranoid individuals who commit
violent crime because they delusionally believe they are being threatened with
deadly force would also often have a defense. Similarly, the person suffering
from command hallucinations who is told by God to commit a crime could be
excused, depending upon the perceived consequences of disobedience. To use
a recent example, if Andrea Yates believed that she needed to kill her children
to make sure they went to heaven instead of hell, she too would have a defense
under the integrationist approach. 1"7
On the other hand, individuals who might be insane under current
insanity tests because of a "lack of appreciation" or "lack of control" but who
intended to commit their crime and lacked motivations that sounded in
justification or duress would not be excused under this approach. For
example, John Hinckley would not have a defense, assuming, as asserted by
his attorneys at trial, that his motivation for trying to kill President Reagan
was solely to impress the actress, Jodie Foster.0" Jeffrey Dahmer (the man
who ate his dead victims), Ted Kaczynski (the "Unabomber"), and David
Berkowitz (the "Son of Sam" serial rapist and killer) would not be excused
either, despite the "irrationality" of their crimes and any "compulsions" that
106. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (defining mens rea in terms of actor's purpose,
knowledge, awareness of risk, or negligence, the latter of which requires analysis of "circumstances known"
to actor); § 2.09(1) (defining duress in terms of whether a person was coerced by unlawful force which "a
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist" and noting in commentary
that the latter provision is meant to "give effect to the defense when an actor mistakenly believes that a
threat to use unlawful force has been made"); § 3.04(2)(c) (permitting use of deadly force whenever "the
actor believes such force is necessary to protect himself against death," serious bodily harm, kidnaping or
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat); § 4.02(1) ("Evidence that the defendant suffered from a
mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have
a state of mind which is an element of the offense."); § 210.3(l)(b) (defining manslaughter as homicide
"committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse.... reasonableness [to] ... be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be") (emphasis added).
107. See Carol Christian, New Witness Challenges Yates' Sanity, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 6, 2002,
available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/topstory2/278348.
108. REISNER ET AL., supra note 29, at 539 (noting that, according to defense experts, "on the day
of the assassination Hinckley was preoccupied with two things: 'the termination of his own existence' and
accomplishing a 'union with Jodie Foster through death, after life').
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may have driven them to commit them."0 Psychopathic offenders who might
be said to be substantially unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of their
conduct or impulsive (but intentional) offenders who assert that they were
unable to control their actions would clearly not have defenses under an
integrationist approach."'
The central justification for integrationism is that the special defense of
insanity is no longer normatively required now that modem criminal codes
have subjectified mens rea and the traditional affirmative defenses. Those
defenses are necessary and sufficient grounds for recognizing the exculpatory
effect of mental illness. In contrast, mentally ill people who commit crime
with the requisite mens rea and in the absence of justificatory or coercive
rationales are not provably different in terms of their perceptions or control
over their behavior than many "normal" individuals who commit crime, such
as those who offend because they do not like the victim, "lose it"
momentarily, or act under the influence of other, more dominant offenders. I"I
The intuition that mentally ill people are qualitatively different in terms of
their ability to avoid crime is undermined by the fact that mentally ill people
offend at no greater rate than the general population;12 even most of those
with serious symptoms do not commit crime." 3
I have defended the integrationist approach at length elsewhere. 4 There
are two aspects of it that I want to emphasize here. First, this version of
excuse does not require proof of a particular "mental disease or defect" or, for
that matter, any mental disease or defect; the important variable is the
motivation for the crime, not the diagnosis. Second, following from the first
point, the focus of culpability analysis under the integrationist approach is the
precise content of the offender's thought, not whether, to use the Michigan
109. Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense: Reflections on
the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates Case, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L.
(forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Integrationist Alternative].
110. See id.
111. See An End to Insanity, supra note 104, at 1230-37.
112. See, e.g., Henry Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 393
(1998) (finding no significant difference between violence rates for discharged patients and non-mentally
ill members of the community, once analysis controlled for presence of substance abuse).
113. See Paul Appelbaum et al., Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566 (2000)
(reporting data indicating that delusions do not increase the overall risk of violence in persons with mental
illness). A large literature also suggests that people with delusions who do commit crime are most often
those who perceive that someone intends to do them harm, see Dale E. McNiel, Jane P. Eisner & Renee L.
Binder, The Relationship Between Aggressive Attributional Style and Violence by Psychiatric Patients,
71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 404 (2003), precisely the type of person most likely to be excused
under the integrationist approach.
114. See An End to Insanity, supra note 104; Integrationist Approach, supra note 109.
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language, there is a "substantial impairment" in judgment, emotions, ability
to recognize reality or control of behavior. The latter considerations are
relevant only to the extent they cast light on the extent to which the offender
possessed the mens rea or was motivated by beliefs that sound in justification
or duress.
B. Police Power Commitment: Undeterrability
Above it was noted that there is significant dispute over the proper role
of mental disorder in justifying police power commitment. Many
commentators have argued that if preventive detention is permissible at all it
is justifiable only for those who are so lacking in autonomy that they would
be considered insane if they committed an offense."' In contrast, the Supreme
Court in Hendricks held that even non-insane individuals may be subject to
long-term police power commitment if they have a mental abnormality that
renders them "dangerous beyond their control.""' 6 Since the Court clearly
contemplated that convicted sex offenders would be committable under this
standard, it rejected the proposition that mental dysfunction akin to that
required for insanity is a prerequisite to commitment." 7
My position falls somewhere between these two stances. 1 8 I believe that
police power commitment is permissible only for those who are undeterred by
the prospect of serious punishment. Most criminal actors would not commit
crime if they knew they would be caught and subject to serious punishment.
But two categories of individuals commit crime even when apprehension is
likely, and thus are undeterrable in the sense used here: (1) those who engage
in criminal conduct unaware that it is criminal or convinced that it is not; and
(2) those who engage in criminal conduct despite awareness of a very high
likelihood they will suffer a serious loss of liberty or death as a result.' The
people in these two categories either cannot or will not abide by the law, and
thus are undeserving of the respect that criminal punishment, which is pre-
mised on the assumption that people have the capacity to be law-abiding and
will act accordingly, grants most individuals.
The first group would be comprised primarily of individuals who suffer
from serious mental disability, one that leads them characteristically either to
be unaware they are engaged in antisocial conduct or to believe their crimes
or contemplated crimes are justified or excused. Included in this group might
115. See supra note 68.
116. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
117. See id.
118. See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U.L. REv. 1 (2003)
[hereinafter Jurisprudence of Dangerousness].
119. Id.at40-48.
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be anyone who is excusable under the integrationist approach, but it might
also include those who believe they are justified in acting even though those
beliefs would not sound in justification or duress (which may have been the
case with John Hinckley, for instance 2°). The people in this category are not
deterrable by the prohibitions of the criminal law because they (erroneously)
think their contemplated actions are not wrongful. Thus, they can be com-
mitted as dangerous, even though some of them (like Hinckley?) could also
be punished if they were to commit crime.
The second group of undeterrable individuals would be comprised of
individuals who know their conduct is criminally prohibited but are char-
acteristically willing to commit it despite being virtually certain of serious
punishment or similar consequence. Captured by the "policeman-at-the-
elbow" rubric, 2 ' it would only apply to a small group of especially blatant sex
offenders and other individuals who are willing to choose crime over free-
dom.'2 2 Within the latter group might be included terrorists who are willing
to commit crime despite certain death.'23 All of these individuals are unaf-
fected by the prospect of punishment, and thus are undeterrable in the sense
used here.
The undeterrability predicate for police power commitment, like the
insanity predicate preferred by commentators and the Court's inability-to-
control concept, is deeply controversial. I defend it and critique the other
approaches at greater length elsewhere. 24 Again, the important point for
present purposes is the nature of the inquiry posed by the undeterrability
notion. The goal is not to find a particular diagnosis or a more global
"significant impairment" in cognition or volition, but rather to discern whether
the individual is likely to believe that his or her criminal actions are not
criminal or is likely to choose to commit them even knowing of a high risk
120. See supra note 108.
121. See United States v. Kunak, 17 C.M.A. 346, 357-58 (1954) (describing this test).
122. See, e.g., In re Kunshier, No. C7-95-1490, 1995 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 1422, at **2-3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1995) (finding offender raped victim while being actively pursued by the police); Alan
Held, The Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators-Experience Under Minnesota's Law, in THE SEXUAL
PREDATOR: LAW, POLICY, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 2-1, 2-19 (Anita Schlank & Fred Cohen eds.,
1999).
123. Cf Zacarias Moussaoui, sometimes described as the "twentieth hijacker" and currently on trial
for conspiracy to commit terroristic acts in connection with the events of September 11, 2001, who has
declared himself "a slave of Allah," prays for the destruction of the United States, and wants to "fight
against the evil force of the federal government." John Gibeaut, Prosecuting Moussaoui, A.B.A. J., July
2002, at 38. He has stated in court documents that he would be "delighted" to blow up the World Trade
Center if it were rebuilt. Philip Shenon, The Nation at War: The Terror Suspect Man Charged in Sept. 11
Attacks Demands that Al Qaeda Leaders Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at B12 (also noting
Moussaoui's "continued allegiance to Al Qaeda and his commitment to the use of violence").
124. Slobogin, supra note 118, at 34-48.
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that one's life or liberty will be sacrificed. As with the integrationist approach
to culpability assessments, the content of the person's motivations is the focus
of the undeterrability evaluation.
C. Competency Determinations: Basic Rationality and Basic Self-
Regard
Virtually everyone agrees that to be competent to make decisions about
treatment or about matters that arise in a criminal trial, the individual must
understand the basic risks and benefits of the decision and its alternatives.
The more difficult determination concerns when a particular decision is
"rational," to use Dusky's language. In Godinez v. Moran,'25 the Supreme
Court came close to holding that an understanding of the risks and benefits is
all that is necessary for a rational decision.'26 At the other end of the spectrum
is the position that only a "reasonable" decision, defined as one the reasonable
doctor or lawyer would make, is rational. In between are at least two other
standards. The "basic rationality" standard requires a finding of competency
unless the reasons for a decision are based on a clearly false assessment of the
risk and benefits. The "appreciation" standard takes a more global approach,
examining whether the decision is significantly affected by pathological
processes.'27
Not surprisingly, given its focus on the reasons for acting, I favor the
basic rationality approach, but with a twist. More specifically, I have argued
that competency to make decisions ought to be defined in terms of "basic
rationality and basic self-regard."' 28 Basic rationality requires non-delusional
reasons for the decision (in addition to an understanding of the relevant infor-
mation). Basic self-regard requires a willingness to exercise autonomy, which
can usually be demonstrated by a willingness to consider alternative scenarios.
Under the basic rationality and self-regard standard, Colin Ferguson's
decision to fire his attorneys because they would not insist on his innocence
was incompetent because he fervently believed he did not commit the crime
125. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
126. Id. at 401 n.12 ("The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant's mental capacity; the
question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings" (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 171 (1975)). The Court went on to hold that a decision must also be "knowing," which it defined as
a determination "whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a
particular decision." Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). The "knowing"
requirement might call for something more than an understanding of the proceedings, but it is worth noting
that the Court ultimately held that Moran, who was severely depressed at the time he waived counsel and
pleaded guilty, made a "knowing" decision. Id. at 410-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127. The basic rationality and appreciation tests are taken from Bonnie, supra note 93, at 571-76.
128. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty to
Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L REV. 1581, 1597-98 (2000).
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despite overwhelming evidence that he gunned down six individuals on the
Long Island Railway.'29 Richard Moran, the petitioner in Godinez v. Moran,
would also be incompetent because he "wasn't very concerned about any-
thing" when he pleaded guilty to four capital murder charges and sat through
his capital sentencing hearing without presenting evidence. 30 Ferguson
lacked basic rationality, while Moran lacked basic self-regard. Because of
their incompetency, they can be prevented from acting on their decisions.
The same standard would apply to parens patriae civil commitment. For
instance, also incompetent under the basic rationality standard is the person
who refuses treatment because he believes he is Jesus Christ and is immune
from disease, both patently false beliefs. As a result of this incompetence, the
faux jesus could be involuntarily hospitalized and treated under the parens
patriae commitment authority.
On the other hand, a person who rejects treatment because of its
acknowledged side effects is not incompetent under the basic rationality
standard even if, contrary to the opinions of all the "experts," he also asserts
he is not mentally ill. The latter assertion, standing alone, is not provably
false; only if the person denies obvious specific symptoms might basic
rationality be lacking. The same might be said about Ted Kaczynski's refusal
to allow mental illness defenses to be raised in his capital murder case, if the
reasons for his refusal were, as he suggested in his Manifesto and elsewhere,
that he would rather die than be labeled "mentally ill."'' That calculus may
seem strange to us, but in the competency context it is Kaczynski's values that
are important, not ours. The mental illness label is too inaccurate to allow us
to fix it absolutely on someone like Kaczynski. A standard based on the
existence of pathological process (the appreciation test) pays too little warrant
to the person's desires and suggests that a person with serious illness can
never make a competent decision about anything. A standard based on "lack
of insight" (the test often used by clinicians) can easily become a proxy for a
straightforward reasonableness inquiry. The person's specific reasons for a
given decision must be demonstrably false to render them incompetent under
the basic rationality and self-regard standard.'32
129. Id. at 1608-09 (describing Ferguson case).
130. Id. at 1607-08 (describing Moran's case).
131. See Stephen J. Dubner, I Don't Want to Live Long. I Would Rather Get the Death Penalty Than
Spend the Rest of My Life in Prison, TIME, Oct. 18, 1999, at 44, 46 ("[H]e will not tolerate being called,
as he put it, 'a nut,' or 'a lunatic' or 'a sicko.' He says he pleaded guilty last year only to stop his lawyers
from arguing he was a paranoid schizophrenic .... "); Theodore Kaczynski, Unabomber's Manifesto,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1995, http://www.soci.niu.edu/ -critcrim/uni/uni.txt>para. 168 ("To many of us,
freedom and dignity are more important than a long life or avoidance of physical pain.").
132. This position has also been strongly argued in ELYN SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED
TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (2002). Professor Saks contends that only people who
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Further defense of the basic rationality and basic self-regard approach is
undertaken elsewhere.13  Once again, the important point for now is that the
test rests on an assessment of thought content. Incompetency exists only if a
person acts for delusional reasons or is unwilling to give any reasons or
consider alternatives. Pathology is relevant only to the extent it is associated
with these types of aberrant thought content.
IV. A COMPARISON OF FOUR MODELS FOR DEFINING LEGALLY RELEVANT
MENTAL DISORDER
The previous section made clear that the inquiries that I think ought to
take place in implementing the punishment, prevention, and protection models
of government-sponsored liberty deprivation-the integrationist, undeterr-
ability, and basic rationality and self-regard inquiries-all depend on an assess-
ment of thought content. It should also be clear by now that the account these
proposals give of when a person should be held responsible for crime, subject
to preventive detention, or considered incompetent is a relatively "thin" one.
Using the language of the Michigan formulation, the focus is primarily on the
individual's capacity to recognize reality. Given little weight in these
proposals are a number of other factors that might be considered relevant to
these determinations, including the quality of the person's thought process and
the person's character and emotional makeup.
For instance, a number of commentators have argued that criminal
responsibility (and therefore preventive detention under schemes that require
that intervention be reserved for the insane) should focus on the consistency
and coherence of one's thoughts, rather than simply the reasons one might
give for the conduct.'34 Similarly, those who have tried to conceptualize com-
petency have thought it important to measure a range of cognitive skills,
lack understanding of or have "patently false beliefs" about the proposed action should be found
incompetent. Id. at 185. She also argues that, under this standard, "denial of mental illness does not
disqualify one from competency," because the person "may simply not be willing to admit something that
is so stigmatizing," because denial is "a common, understandable, and quite adaptive defense," and because
"mental illness diagnoses are simply less certain than many physical illness diagnoses." Id. at 190-91
(footnotes omitted). However, under the standard as I would apply it, denial of specific symptoms that
clearly exist (e.g., hallucinations, delusions) would lead to a finding of incompetency. Cf. Xavier F.
Amador & Andrew A. Shiva, Insight into Schizophrenia: Anosognosia, Competency, and Civil Liberties,
11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 25, 27 (2000) (noting this distinction).
133. Slobogin & Mashbum, supra note 128, at 1598-1610.
134. MOORE, supra note 27, at 100-08 (arguing that one must look at the "intelligibility" of desires
and beliefs, their consistency with one another, and the extent to which they logically cohere with and are
implied by one another); SCHOPP, supra note 68, at 165-66 (describing "the need for standards of criminal
responsibility framed in terms of impaired process, rather than belief content" and concluding that "the
major psychological disorders that provide the most plausible bases for exculpation under the insanity
defense are characterized by distortion of psychological process," not just "inaccurate belief content").
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including the person's ability to seek information and to imagine the conse-
quences of one's decisions.'35 Using the Michigan formulation for mental dis-
order, these approaches are concerned about whether there is a "significant
impairment injudgment," although they operationalize that concept somewhat
more precisely.
Others' accounts of criminal responsibility and competency, as well as
the Supreme Court's account of undeterrability, 136 additionally contemplate
some attempt to measure the strength of one's urges, either toward criminality
or toward harming oneself.'37 A person is mentally disordered if his or her
actions, whether they involve commission of crime, resisting treatment, or
waiving an attorney, are "compelled" or strongly influenced by psychological
or characteriological forces, which in turn may be the product of biology or
the environment.' 38 In the Michigan formulation's terms, these approaches
attempt to determine whether there is a significant impairment in behavior.
Still other legal authorities have appeared to look solely at the externally
discernible dysfunction that results from the disorder. Thus, some have
advocated giving exculpatory effect to any identifiable disorder that causes
crime. 139 In the parens patriae setting, some courts have defined mental dis-
order simply in terms of whether it causes inability to provide for one's basic
needs. 4' The analogue to the latter approach in the Michigan formulation is
135. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. If: Measures of
Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 134-36 (1995)
(discussing a competency instrument that seeks to measure reasoning capacity by examining ability to seek
information, generate and weigh consequences, and engage in consequential, comparative, complex,
transitive, and probabilistic thinking).
136. See supra note 72.
137. See REISNER ET AL., supra note 29, at 523-24 (noting that development of the irresistible
impulse test for insanity grew out of concern that purely cognitive tests did not recognize the compelling
influence of mental disorder).
138. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1511, 1524 (1992) (arguing that "the most
persuasive conception of a moral agent's necessary attributes cannot be derived solely from an account of
the conditions of knowledge, reason, and control that must be satisfied before we can fairly attribute
culpable conduct to the actor" and advancing "a normative, character-based conception of moral agency").
139. KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 253-68 (1968). The original Durham rule, see
supra note 51, is the best formal legal example of this approach. It was first proposed by Isaac Ray. See
HENRY WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH: NEW APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL
IRRESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIME 5 (1956). As noted earlier, the Durham court later tried to limit the definition
of mental disease or defect for purposes of the insanity defense. See supra note 51.
140. See, e.g., In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088-89 (Utah 1981) (construing the formulation
"'[in]capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions"' in guardian statute to mean an impairment
that renders the person "unable to care for his personal safety or unable to attend to and provide for such
necessities as food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, without which physical injury or illness may
occur").
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its reference to significant impairment in the ability "to cope with the ordinary
demands of life."
For simplicity sake, I am going to refer to these competing approaches
as the process, predisposition, and external models of disorder and to my
approach as the content model of disorder. This section looks at these models
more closely. It does so first from a philosophical perspective. It then dis-
cusses practical concerns, specifically issues relating to ease of application
and the impact of these various approaches on the lives of people with mental
illness.
A. The Legal Relevance of the Four Models
At the risk of some confusion, note first that the process, predisposition,
and external models of legally relevant disorder match the three approaches
to clinically-defined disorder described at the beginning of this article (which
I called the process, etiological, and effects categorizations)."'4 The content
model has no direct clinical analogue. More importantly for present purposes,
each of the four legal models have difficulties capturing the legally relevant
considerations connected with mental disorder, a point which is best made by
looking at the predisposition model first, followed by the external, process,
and content models.
The primary philosophical problem with the predisposition model of dis-
order is that it does not fit well with a legal system premised on free will and
autonomous decision making. All behavior is caused, if not by biology or
character, then by environment. While some behavior may seem "over-
caused," in fact predispositions and compulsions cannot be sensibly distin-
guished from mere "causes" (outside of those situations where a person is
literally not in control of his or her body'42). Consider the following ques-
tions. Is a person with severe schizophrenia who commits rape more "com-
pelled" than a person with pedophilia or a person who rapes out of stress and
anger? Is a person who reports strong urges to act or to make a particular
decision more volitionally impaired than a person who is unaware of his or her
urges?'43 Is a person who commits a criminal act that is "out-of-character"
(ego-dystonic) acting less autonomously because it is so out of the ordinary,
141. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
142. See generally Deborah Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87
MINN. L. REv. 269, 344-51 (2002) (discussing limited scenarios in which offender's actions are truly
"involuntary" because of unconsciousness).
143. Cf. Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960) (reversing conviction of police officer
whose experts asserted he was insane because he was driven to commit a series of robberies by his
unconscious desire to be punished for not protecting his wife and child, who were brutally murdered when
he was not at home).
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or is that person acting volitionally, again because it is so out of the ordinary?
Is the ego-syntonic act relatively uncontrollable because it is "programmed,"
or does it merely reflect an individual's characteristic "willed" choices?'"
These questions are probably unanswerable. Yet given its tendency to ascribe
behavior to one's biology, character, or environment, the predispositional
model of mental disorder pushes in the direction of characterizing every act
and every decision as "compelled," thus rendering the concepts of culpability,
deterrability, and competency meaningless.
The external model of mental disorder undermines the premises of the
legal system in a similar way. It attempts to avoid the difficulties of plumbing
one's internal psychological processes by looking solely at its manifestations
in the outside world-whether a crime is committed or whether a person has
become gravely disabled. Yet because of this focus on conduct, distinctions
about culpability, deterrability, and competency assessments are glossed over.
Unless we want to say that all crime (even premeditated burglary) and all
grave disability (even that associated with homeless people who like to be
homeless'45) is the result of disorder, we need some method of distinguishing
between causes that are "disordered" and those that are not. That analysis
presumably requires resorting to some assessment of the mental states that
accompany crime and grave disability.
Of course, the legal system could jettison the free will premise and the
preference for autonomy. It could accept the assertion that intentionality is a
myth, an ex post explanation of actions that are caused by forces beyond our
control.' 6 It could adopt the position that because all behavior is caused by
biology, character, and environment; no one is culpable and no decisions are
truly one's own.'4 7 But these are not the law's assumptions today, and they
144. Consider these comments from Professor Arenella, who argues for a character-based assessment
of culpability but recognizes possible problems with this approach:
[S]houldn't we view moral agency on a continuum rather than as a bipolar "all or nothing"
determination? And, if we do, should not serious deficiencies in the actor's ability to
exercise these moral capacities support a full excuse? If so, then evil could.., turn out to
be its own exemption.
Arenella, supra note 138, at 1613.
145. See supra note 86. Cf Carl I. Cohen & Kenneth S. Thompson, Homeless Mentally Ill or
Mentally Ill Homeless, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 816 (1992) (arguing that the distinction between "the
general homeless" and the mentally ill homeless is "illusory").
146. Cf Denise C. Park, Acts of Will?, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 461, 461 (1999). This article introduces
a series of pieces-all on the topic "Behavior-It's Involuntary"-by noting that all the pieces conclude:
[T]here are mental activations of which we are unaware and environmental cues to which
we are not consciously attending that have a profound effect on our behavior and that help
explain the complex puzzle of human motivation and actions that are seemingly
inexplicable, even to the individual performing the actions.
147. Cf Mark P. Fondacaro, Toward an Ecological Jurisprudence Rooted in Concepts of Justice
and Empirical Research, 69 UMKC L. REv. 179, 186 (2000) (noting that the presumption of "traditional
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will not be the law's assumptions any time in the foreseeable future, regard-
less of what science tells us about the causes of behavior. 4 In the meantime,
the law should assume that one's choices are the proximate causes of behavior
and define mental disorder accordingly.
Both the process and content models of mental disorder seek to accomp-
lish that task. As already noted, the process model looks at a person's mental
states in relatively global terms. As described by Michael Moore, one of its
progenitors, the process model examines the intelligibility of the desires and
beliefs motivating the action, as well as the consistency and coherence of
those desires and beliefs.'49 The content model, in contrast, focuses on the
intelligibility of desires and beliefs, while relegating the consistency and cohe-
rence inquiries to secondary status. Another way of understanding the con-
trast is through consideration of the MacArthur Network's conceptualization
of competency to make treatment decisions. In its experimental work on
competency, the Network developed three assessment instruments, one that
measures understanding of the situation, another that measures the accuracy
of the premises underlying the reasons for making a decision, and a third that
gauges the ability to make rational inferences (i.e., the ability to seek
information; generate, consider, and compare the consequences of particular
decisions; and engage in transitive and probabilistic thinking)." 0 The process
model of disorder would consider all of these measures relevant, whereas the
content model would rely solely on the first two.
If the type of mental disorder that the process model suggests the law
should privilege had to be described in a single sentence, it would perhaps
best be captured not by the Michigan language, the amorphous nature of
which has been discussed, but the American Psychiatric Association's defini-
tion of mental disease or defect in the insanity context: "[T]hose severely
abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's
perception or understanding of reality .... ""'' The content model, instead,
looks at the precise way in which the person's perception or understanding of
reality was impaired. More specific examples of the contrast have already
been suggested. John Hinckley would probably be excused under the process
legal doctrine [that] people are autonomous, independent, rational actors ... is highly inconsistent with the
weight of behavioral science research, which clearly demonstrates that human behavior is best understood
when it is judged in context, and that behavior is a function of both personal and situational influences")
(footnotes omitted).
148. Cf HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 75 (1968) ("Tbe idea of free will
in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement of fact, but rather a value preference having
very little to do with the metaphysics of determinism and free will.").
149. See supra note 134.
150. See Grisso et al., supra note 135.
151. MELTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 196.
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model but not under the content model. Ted Kaczynski would probably be
incompetent under the process model but not the content model. Those few
people who are undeterrable because they would choose crime over freedom
are committable under the content model but not the process model, while a
large number of people who are "substantially impaired in judgment or
behavior" could be committed under the latter model but not the former.
My hunch is that the process model more closely conforms with the lay
notion of mental illness. Yet it also assumes that a person with severe patho-
logy cannot act culpably, is undeterrable under all circumstances, and is
significantly compromised in terms of autonomy. For reasons suggested
above, I am not convinced. Again, a severely impaired person who intention-
ally kills, motivated by desires and beliefs that do not sound in justification or
duress, is often as culpable as many other non-mentally ill people and may be
just as deterrable. 5 2 A severely impaired person who nonetheless is able to
refuse treatment or insist on waiving an insanity defense for nondelusional
reasons is just as competent as many other non-mentally ill people.'53 The
intuition that irrational thought process captures the gravamen of legally rele-
vant mental illness is just that-an intuition, based on unproven beliefs about
people with mental illness on the one hand and on misinformed assumptions
about normality on the other.
Ultimately, choosing between the two models is a normative decision, not
a scientific one. Exculpation or commitment under the process standard fails
152. If instead we were to say that impaired people are excused because they could not control their
thoughts (and so are less blameworthy) or just didn't think about the right reasons for acting (and so are
undeterrable), consider these comments from H.L.A. Hart:
[A] theory that mental operations like... thinking about... [one's] situation are somehow
"either there nor not there," and so utterly outside our control, can lead to the theory that we
are never responsible... [floriust as [someone] might say "My mind was a blank" or "I just
forgot" or "I just didn't think, I could not help not thinking" so the cold-blooded murderer
might say "I just decided to kill; I couldn't help deciding."
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBIITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 151 (1968).
153. Consider these comments from Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke:
It is unclear that pure or pristine reasoning plays an essential role in all effective decision
making. Intuitive and idiosyncratic processes may actually improve decision making in
certain instances (consider cases in which people dream of solutions to difficult mathe-
matical problems, or police officers who solve a case on a "hunch"). Perhaps more
important, even generally effective decision makers who indisputably have the ability to
form accurate beliefs misuse statistics, misunderstand probabilities, and accord undue
weight to vivid examples. They may also be profoundly affected by irrational and uncon-
scious factors. Unless we are willing to declare most people incompetent, declaring only the
mentally ill who lack reasoning skills incompetent risks unjustifiably discriminating against
individuals on the basis of mental illness.
Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research: MacArthur and
Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 115 (1999).
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to give credence to the fact that even severely impaired people can engage in
isolated actions-whether they are crimes, decisions about treatment, or
waivers of criminal rights-based on nondelusional reasons. 54 Such choices
should count for more than they do under the process model. Under the
content model, the person's precise motivation for acting is the important
variable, not the extent to which he or she suffers from significant pathology.
It should also be noted that, compared to the process model, the content
model will result in fewer findings of legally relevant mental disorder. Bruce
Winick has argued that if we are serious about our preference for autonomy,
we ought to prefer narrow legal definitions of mental disorder, not just on
deontological grounds but because the mental disorder label undermines self-
esteem and the willingness to change. 55 While some civil libertarians may be
bothered that fewer people would be found insane under the content model
than under the process model, they may be comforted by the fact that fewer
will be committed and found incompetent. It is also worth remembering that
the consequences of an acquittal on insanity grounds are often no better than
those that follow conviction.'56
B. Reliability Under the Process and Control Models
For reasons discussed above, the predisposition and external models of
mental disorder do not map onto the foundational premises of the legal
system. The rest of the discussion will thus focus on the process and content
models. Addressed here is a second consideration in choosing between the
two: What is the relative feasibility of determining when a particular person
is irrational (under the process model) and when a person acts for reasons that
suggest a lack of culpability, deterrability, or competency (under the content
model)?
154. It is a well-known feature of mental disorders that a person who has delusions about some things
can be perfectly rational about others. See, e.g., DSM-IV, supra note 6, at 287 (stating delusions in people
with paranoid schizophrenia "may be multiple, but are usually organized around a coherent theme"); id.
at 297 ("[A] common characteristic of individuals with Delusional Disorder is the apparent normality of
their behavior and appearance when their delusional ideas are not being discussed or acted on."). Similarly,
severely impaired people can still give good reasons for making certain decisions. See Morris, supra note
103, at 405-07 (documenting that patients whom psychiatrists thought were seriously disordered often
refused medication because of side effects, and noting that such a reason "may be a rational basis to support
a medication refusal").
155. Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Competency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal
and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 581-82 (1995).
156. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 188-89 (reporting studies indicating that most people
acquitted by reason of insanity spend as long or longer in the hospital than felons convicted of the same
offense).
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On the face of it, determining a person's reasons for acting should be
easier than assessing the various, additional types of cognitive functioning that
are relevant to the process model. The mental phenomena to be evaluated
under the process model are much more complex than those that need to be
assessed under the content model. Consistent with this logic, the MacArthur
Network found that, in administering the three measures described earlier,
inter-rater reliability was lower for the instrument meant to gauge reasoning
process than for the other two instruments.1
57
That is not to say that making accurate determinations under the content
model will be simple, however. First, the reasons people give for acting may
be inaccurate in both a shallow and a deep sense. They are inaccurate in the
shallow sense when the person lies about his or her motivations, which is not
uncommon in the forensic context. 5 8 They are inaccurate in the deep sense
when even honest accounts do not appear to explain one's actions or deci-
sions. A Freudian can have a field day determining one's true motivations.159
Even if we can be reasonably sure we can trust a person's account of his
or her motivations, we may often find there is more than one reason given.
That is not a serious problem when the reasons all suggest nonculpability or
incompetency or, conversely, when they all suggest culpability or competency.
But more than occasionally that is not what happens. At one point, Andrea
Yates said she killed her children because otherwise they would go to hell. At
another point, she said she killed them because she did not want them to grow
up to be bad teenagers.160 Ms. Northern refused an operation on her gangren-
ous foot, despite the high possibility she might die in the absence of surgery,
because she was aware that the surgery itself was life-threatening (although
less so than foregoing the surgery) and because she thought the black color of
her foot was due to soot.'61 These types of cases could be an argument for the
process model, which places more emphasis on inconsistent, incoherent
reasoning. On the other hand, these cases should probably result in a finding
of mental disorder under the content model as well. If one of the reasons that
157. Grisso et al., supra note 135, at 139, 144 (indicating lower inter-rater reliability for the TRAT
(Thinking Rationally About Treatment) instrument than for the UTD (Understanding Treatment
Disclosures), and concluding that, while "most subtests" in these two instruments and the POD (Perception
of Disorder) instrument "can be scored reliably by nonprofessionals," certain TRAT subtests "may require
special care and consideration"); see also THOMAS G~isso & PAUL APPELBAUM, MANUAL FOR THINKING
RATIONALLY ABOUT TREATMENT 19 (1993) (reporting relatively low kappa correlations when TRAT was
not scored by "master scorer") (on file with author).
158. MELTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 44 (discussing potential for malingering in forensic
assessments).
159. Cf. SAKS, supra note 132, at 187 ("[Mlany patients decide to accept treatment on the basis of
an unconscious fantasy that their doctor is omnipotent and will protect them from all harm.").
160. See Christian, supra note 107.
161. Dep't Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
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seem to explain a particular action or decision suggests legally relevant dis-
order, it makes sense to conclude the disorder exists.
All things considered, the content model is probably only marginally
easier to apply than the process model. But that is still an argument in its
favor.
C. Stigma and Discrimination Under the Process and Content Models
A final consideration is the impact of the two models on those who are
labeled mentally ill. The three groups of people discussed in this article are
the most stigmatized, maligned groups in society.'6 2 Called "criminally
insane," "dangerous madmen" or "predators," and "incompetent," they are
perceived as and treated like outcasts.
One argument for the content model, already alluded to, is that it subjects
fewer people to these stigmatizing labels than does the process model. But the
positive impact of the content model may go deeper. In particular, under the
integrationist approach to culpability assessments, there would no longer be
a special defense for people with mental illness; they would instead be excul-
pated or convicted on the same basis as those who are not mentally ill. People
excused in this regime would not be "criminally insane" but acquitted because
they honestly believed they were justified or did not intend their acts, grounds
which should be easier for the public to swallow than a verdict of "not guilty
because of mental illness," and thus grounds that are less likely to inspire
disdain or repulsion.
To a lesser extent, the content model's application in the prevention and
protection settings should also alleviate the current system's tendency-which
the process model would not alleviate-to single out people with mental illness
as a special, reviled class. Undeterrability analysis of the type advanced here
would base commitment of dangerous people not on mental disorder but on
obliviousness toward punishment, which would encompass not only those
whose mental confusion leads them to believe antisocial acts arejustified, but
also those "rational" individuals, like terrorists, who characteristically choose
crime over freedom. A regime that permits preventive confinement of indivi-
duals who are obviously not mentally ill, at the same time it minimizes
preventive confinement of those who are, is less likely than today's commit-
ment law (which insists on mental disorder and defines that term broadly'63)
162. See, e.g., Deborah C. Scott et al., Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut's Psychiatric
Security Review Board, 41 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 980,982 (1990) (describing survey response that
called insanity acquittees the "most despised and feared group in society"); see generally Bruce J. Winick,
Sex Offender Laws in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 505,
547 (1998) (discussing stigmatizing effects of "mentally ill" and "mentally abnormal" labels).
163. See supra notes 2 & 71-78.
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to feed the public's preconception that mental illness and abnormal dangerous-
ness are synonymous."6 Similarly, the basic rationality and self-regard test
would find incompetent only those whose decisions are based on patently
false beliefs, suggesting, contrary to current law, that mental illness and incap-
acity are not inevitably linked.
None of this, by itself, will eliminate the stigma associated with mental
disorder or the discrimination that results from that stigma. But at least the
content model of mental disorder minimizes the law's contribution to that
stigma. Indeed, it moves far in the direction of erasing "mental disorder" as
a discrete predicate for laws that authorize government deprivations of liberty.
CONCLUSION
Elimination of "mental illness" and like terms from the legal lexicon may
be too radical a step at this point in time. But, as a substantial move in that
direction, it is worth considering the abolition of the special defense of insan-
ity and the orientation of commitment and competency determinations toward
an evaluation of thought content and away from amorphous assessments of
predispositions, dysfunction, or irrational thought process. Those modifica-
tions would be far preferable to the law's current haphazard and under-con-
ceptualized definitions of mental disorder. They also would be more consis-
tent with the norms that drive the punishment, prevention, and protection
regimes than models of disorder based either on predisposition or dysfunc-
tional conduct, and at least as consistent with those norms as a process model
of mental disorder. Finally, compared to the process model of disorder, the
content model would be easier to implement and less stigmatizing and thus,
in the long run, more beneficial to all who are unfortunate enough to be
labeled "mentally ill."
164. The public's association of mental illness with dangerousness has increased dramatically since
the 1950s. John Phelan et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness in 1950 and in 1996: Has
Sophistication Increased? Has Stigma Declined? Paper presented at the meeting of the American
Sociological Association, Toronto, Ontario (August, 1997) (cited in SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra
note 29, at 7).
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